University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well

University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well
Honors Capstone Projects

Student Scholarship

2022

Explaining Democratization in South Korea: Comparing
Movements in the 1980s
Isaiah Nielsen
University of Minnesota - Morris, niels693@morris.umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/honors
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Nielsen, Isaiah, "Explaining Democratization in South Korea: Comparing Movements in the 1980s" (2022).
Honors Capstone Projects. 18.
https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/honors/18

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of Minnesota Morris
Digital Well. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of
University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. For more information, please contact skulann@morris.umn.edu.

Explaining Democratization in South Korea
Comparing Movements in the 1980s
Isaiah Nielsen1*
Abstract
This paper seeks to analyze the reasons for democratization movements in the Republic
of Korea (ROK) in the late 1970s/early 1980s and mid to late 1980s leading to different political
outcomes and democratization success. The analysis will dive into the history and politics
leading up to the 1980s, and the context of political movements historically, but will focus on the
1980s. It will trace the context of the early democracy movement leading to the Gwangju
Uprising in 1980. Then, it will seek to understand the revitalized democratization movement that
came to a head in 1987 in Seoul leading to the beginning of the democratic experiment apparent
in South Korea today. This paper seeks to compare and contrast the difference in
anti-government protestors/pro-democracy advocates’ and government action that led to
completely different outcomes: one ending in a violent repression and the other in regime
capitulation and reform. Understanding this within the South Korean case will improve our
understanding of democratization in the face of state opposition and points to potential strategies
in democratization within the realm of international politics.
Introduction
South Korea’s democratization movement is one the most researched and seminal cases
of democratization in East Asia and the world. From the tumultuous period of 1980 to 1987,
South Korean politics and government went through a significant series of events that have
shaped South Korea’s democracy to this day. One fascinating trait of the South Korean case is
that there were two connected, but distinct democratization movements: one around 1980-1981
and the other around 1985-1987. The first movement was unable to succeed in regime change or
capitulation, but the second movement was highly successful which led to the watershed moment
of government concessions to the democratization movement during the height of
demonstrations in 1987. Political and social scientists alike have pondered the question: why the
difference? This paper will explore this question.
South Korea’s democratization allows for a unique approach to understanding
democratization for a number of reasons. The time frame for the two movements are relatively
close when compared to multiple emerging democratization movements of other countries. This
1
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allows for greater validity when scouring for explanations during analysis of the changes that
happened between and during the two movements. Further on this point, it means that both
movements have similar historical context and understanding. Because both movements happen
within the same Republic of Korea (ROK) and within the same decade, the people, history,
government, and their ideological heritage (Confucianism) is exactly the same. This allows us to
isolate those variables more easily2 and to look more accurately at what could be potential
influences of that pro- and anti-democratic forces during this era which could point to why the
movements differed in results.
I structured and organized this paper into three main sections. In the first section, I briefly
state important events from the 1960s and 1970s in order to set the historical context, but narrate,
in detail, the timeline of events of the South Korean democratization movement in the 1980s. In
the second section, with the narrative in mind, I examine Samuel P. Huntington’s larger
theoretical framework on democratization from his article “Third Wave of Democracy” and the
response to it by Kang Jung In in order to discuss East Asia’s compatibility with democracy.
Then, I present South Korean movement specific theories of explanatory factors for the
democratization movements. In the third section, I compare and discuss the larger differences
between the movements. I conclude that the difference between the earlier and later movements
show us that, for successful democratization in South Korea, diverse coalition-building from a
strong civil society was crucial in pressuring and utilizing the structures in place.
Democratization in South Korea
The era of democratization was one of the most turbulent periods in South Korea political
history, but it did not emerge in a vacuum.3 The events in the decades preceding the movements
show key insights into the context of the democratization movements of the 1980s: the classes
stratified, the government was developed as the key adversary to the people, and early political
organization and resistance emerged. The movement in early 1980s and the government
responses were reactionary and counter-reactionary answers to those rapid developments and to
each other. Liberalization efforts by the government were not enough to cut its faltering
legitimacy and a revitalized and organized movement in the late 1980s demanded reforms to the
constitution. The government, under immense pressure, caved to the demands of the movement
and paved the way to democracy in South Korea.
A weak Second Republic of Korea that emerged after President Syngman Rhee’s
(이승만) resignation in April 1960 was overthrown in a military coup d’etat led by General Park
Chung-hee (박정희) on May 16, 1961 – known as the May 16 Revolution. General Park ruled by
2
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military junta under martial law for a few years during which he reorganized the government,
ruthlessly consolidated power, and appointed loyal military allies to key positions including the
newly formed Korean Central Intelligence Agency 4 (KCIA) (Chang 2008). In 1962, Park retired
from the military, then, in 1963, ran in and won the presidential election5 which inaugurated the
Third Republic of Korea (Chang 2008).
In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea rapidly evolved from a devastated, post-war nation
to a global economy, and the economic development and success meant political success for Park
at the 1967 election (Chang 2008). In 1971, at the end of President Park’s supposed last term, he
forced the National Assembly to pass the Yushin Constitution 6 (유신 헌법). The Yushin
Constitution was essentially an “in house7” coup d’etat (Chang 2008, 654) and the Fourth
Republic of Korea was established. The authoritarianism of the new constitution was apparent
and opposition emerged in the populace, but it came to a head once Park started using emergency
decrees to “legally justify” (Chang 2008, 655) a massive repression of protests, arresting of
dissidents, abolition of democratic institutions and curtailing of civil liberties (Chang 2008; Kern
and Laux 2017, 257). The tactics of the Park regime were successful in lowering the number of
protests by 1979, but not the pressure (Chang 2008; Park 2012). In the 1970s, the disparities in
the distribution of economic development between sectors, regions8, and class became apparent
(Kim 2003, 229), and, by the late 1970s, an economic crisis loomed. Protests grew9 more
anti-regime and pro-democracy as exemplified by the Bu-Ma Protests (부마민주항쟁) and the
movement began pulling in more members of society – like the harshly repressed laborer class,
intelligentsia, and religious groups (Kim 2003; Park 2012; Shamsur Rahman 1999). The ruling
regime10 – formed from the military, technical bureaucrats, and chaebol11 (재벌) – started to
become rattled (Kim 2003; Park 2012).
In what might be arguably one of the most important events in modern Korean history, on
October 26, 1979, during a dinner at the Blue House, President Park was assassinated12 by KCIA
Director and close friend Kim Jae-gyu13 (김재규) (Park 2012). Prime Minister Choi Gyu-ha
4
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(최규하) took the mantle as acting president, but would not last long (Park 2012). On December
12, 1979 in what is known as the 12.12 Military Insurrection (12.12 군사반란), a series of
military skirmishes broke out in downtown Seoul when General Chun Doo-hwan (전두환),
without consulting Acting President Choi, arrested General Jeong Seung-hwa (정승화), Park’s
Army Chief of Staff who was present at the Blue House during his assassination, on suspicion
for his involvement in the assassination of Park. The aftermath left Chun and his hardliner allies
in sole control of the military (Jean 2003). A few months of limbo and uncertainty led to more
protests and demonstrations (Kern and Laux 2017), but Chun declared martial law on May 15,
1980, purged the old regime and opposition party (“purified” the Park regime instead of
“revolutionizing it” (Gohar 1988, 55)), banned political activity, and dissolved the National
Assembly (Gohar 1988). In the end, General Chun slowly gained more control of the
government until May 17, 1980 when he led a military coup d’etat and declared martial law was
extended to the whole country (Park 2012). Daily protests surged in that month in Seoul, but an
important event was beginning to come under way in Gwangju.
Gwangju Uprising14 and 1980-1 Democratization Movement
Jeolla province was arguably the politically rowdiest in South Korea. Jeolla was a thorn
in the side of the Japanese colonial government for Jeolla perceived that they experienced the
brunt of exploitation, was the most hurt by the industrial worker exodus due to the import of US
goods as a primarily agricultural and fisheries province during the Rhee regime, and was
seriously underdeveloped under the Park regime (the little industry they did have had poor
working conditions) (Jean 2003) leading to more apparent class contradictions15 (Jean 2003).
Other regions, like Park Chung-hee’s home province Gyeongsang, got favored in developmental
opportunities (Jean 2003). All of these factors led the Jeolla/Honam region to form a sort of
separate identity and they would be much more critical of the government (Jean 2003). Gwangju,
as the only large city connected to Seoul by transport, was the nexus of the entire area – many
students attended Chonnam National University (CNU) and it became the financial, social,
cultural, and political center of the region. One author sums it up, the “Gwangju People’s
Uprising was an explosion of political grievances in the region, grievances which had
accumulated in the process of the development of Korean capitalism and which were condensed

some others would support him in the coup d’etat, but they all went to the military headquarters to declare martial
law. The investigation was started by Gen. Chun where Kim was subsequently arrested and later executed in May
1980.
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It has had many names for different political purposes/interests at different times. It was labeled the Gwangju Riot
by elites in 1980-1987, the Gwangju Incident by the Fifth Republic under Chun, the Gwangju Democratization
Movement by the liberal media, and the Gwangju Massacre by victims’ families. The most common academic use is
the Gwangju People’s Uprising or the Gwangju People’s Armed Insurrection. The people in Gwangju call it the
Gwangju Democratization Struggle (광주 민주화 항쟁).
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in a specific way in the political structure of 1980 with the new military authorities’ intentional
choice of the region” (Jean 2003, 177).
On May 18-19, 1980, students at CNU gathered to protest the implementation of martial
law and the military’s presence in the city to close the schools. The army tried to disperse the
gathering and students were brutally treated – stripping, beating, and other inhumane treatment.
Seeing this treatment, the Gwangju citizens at-large became upset at the now apparent dictatorial
problems there was now a “generalized fervor” in the city (Na 2001, 479). On May 19-21, as
violent repression went up especially on innocent people including deaths and a shooting on
innocent people, it was now a city-wide uprising (Na 2001). Mass demonstrations and attacks on
government/police buildings and cars/property. A turning point came on May 21 when the
soldiers shot at the crowds at protests at the Provincial Office. After shooting on crowds, people
began to arm themselves – even getting dynamite from local miners (Na 2001). One scholar
divided the uprising into three phases. In the first (21st), armed clashes between soldiers and
people, forced soldiers to withdraw from the city. The second phase (21st-26th), one of the most
unique phenomena in world history, is called the “autonomous commune period” or “liberated
Gwangju” (Na 2001, 480. When put romantically, in Gwangju, “a community of love [was]
created in the heat of battle” (Katsiaficas 2009, 61). There was no looting or crime and teams
were created to help restore order by helping organize funerals, cleaning the streets, reopening
shops etc. (Na 2001). Daily pro-democracy and civil participation rallies were held with only
limited skirmishes with the army in the outskirts of the city (Katsiaficas 2009; Na 2001). The
unity in Gwangju’s movement was quite unprecedented: “During the ‘absolute community’ of
the Gwangju uprising, people’s capacity for self-organization and self-discipline is beyond the
belief of many North Americans, unaccustomed as we are to even the most rudimentary forms of
civil behavior in public spaces” (Katsiaficas 2009, 63). There were no records of executions of
captured soldiers, but stories of releasing them and at least one story of a soldier being returned
his rifle (without ammo) so he would not get in trouble with his superiors (Katsiaficas 2009).
Nonetheless, a rift formed between those who urged surrender and those who favored resistance
(Na 2001). By the 25th those supporting resistance had more sway. The platitude “all good
things must come to an end” rings true for the liberated Gwangju. Early in the morning on the
26th, soldiers re-entered the city. They were met with strong resistance, but they eventually
re-captured the Provincial Office by force on the 27th. This marked the end of the Gwangju
Uprising (Na 2001). There were more casualties at the second entrance of the soldiers because
not all struggling had weapons (Na 2001). The exact number of deaths is deeply disputed to this
day, but the number is at least in hundreds and some have claimed thousands (Na 2001). The
historical national memory is complex16 (Kim 2011), and it is politically contested with
misinformation about the facts permeating today (Jean 2003). Gwangju’s geographical isolation
16
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made it difficult for Koreans to know what was happening at first, but once the news was caught
by international media it was a massive shift (Yun 1997). Everyone agrees that it was an
inflection point in the movement (Park 2012).
Immediately following the Gwangju Uprising, anti-American17 sentiments ran high. The
US and ROK forces built the Combined Forces Command which placed 80% of ROK troops
directly under a US General (Shorrock 1986). In 1980, General Wickham allowed Chun to take
out 20,000 troops which were deployed to Gwangju (Shorrock 1986). The US was ambiguous in
their support of Chun though. They would not overthrow him when military officers came to the
US offering a coup, but they would not support him outright either (Shorrock 1986). Frustration
with the US grew for Koreans, and especially Gwangju citizens, from tacit acceptance of the
Chun regime by the US; it was seen as ultra realpolitik for US national interests (Shorrock 1986).
It came to a head in mid-1980s with Koreans, especially students decrying proposed US
economic involvement (dubbed “market terrorism”), nuclear weapons, and military cooperation
(Shorrock 1986). Protests at major US institutions surged in 1985 and 1986 including a sit-in at
the US Information Service in Seoul (Shorrock 1986), arson attempts at the US Cultural Centers
in Busan and Gwangju, and a strike at the center in Seoul in 1985 (Na 2001). The US at best
implicitly supported the repression and at worst did not act to stop the problem (Na 2001), but
would try in a limited way, during the negotiation period and the rise of the pro-democracy
movement, to broker a compromise (Shorrock 1986).
In spring 1981, Chun proposed a new constitution to form the Fifth Republic of Korea
and was elected president without any political party opposition after lifting martial law (Gohar
1988). After initial hesitation – assisted by the memory of Gwangju – opposition to the Chun
regime became more vocal. The KCIA, though, was closely watching all opposition groups –
including Christian groups, students, and unions, and left the military and police on the streets
deterring protests (which were low during those years) (Kern and Laux 2017) . The new
constitution was virtually the same as the wildly unpopular and repressive Yushin Constitution
and the lack of direct elections was a sore point (Gohar 1988).
Liberalization Years 1982-5, Crises Years 1986-7, and the 1987 June Democratic Struggle18
Facing mounting pressure and losing whatever slim legitimacy/recognition they did have,
during 1982 to 1985, the Chun regime attempted to liberalize to relieve the pressure: soldiers and
police removed from streets and universities and political parties and autonomous organizations
allowed.
The liberalization, some amnesty, releases of prisoners, reinstatement of professors and
students, un-purging politicians – all had the reverse effect: autonomous organizations formed
and political party success with NKDP in the midterm elections of 1985 (even though it was
formed only a few weeks before the National Assembly elections) (Yun 1997). Although still
containing some radical elements which alienated some sectors, the student movement was
17
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revitalized, nationalized, and complexified – that is, they formed national autonomous groups
and began to diversify and expand their tools of resistance (Yun 1997). An “organizational
duality” (Yun 1997, 159) – both legal and illegal (as in underground) movements was crucial to
their success – they no longer only had to work illegally. Students “undercover” to work in
factories and spread message of anti-government movement and assist in forming unions and
strikes – best exemplified by the Kuro Alliance Strike in 1985 (hakchul) (Park 2005; Yun 1997)
They Also performed “seminars” to educate urban poor (binhwal), rural (nonghwal), as well as
factory worker (gonghwal) and held free night classes (yahak) for those in urban area (Park
2005). They organized complex illegal street demonstrations (gatu) (Park 2005) and suffered
through repressions, tear gas, beatings, torture, but also were able to pull together the main
groups (Lee 1993). Labor (“militant industrial workers”), emerged from the labor repression
which was severe under Park and made worse for years under Chun Doo-hwan and evolved in
multiple stages to form a key player in the United Minjung (People’s) Movement for Democracy
and Unification (UMMDU) (Gohar 1988; Lee 1993). The US openly supported democratic
opposition forces by applying “timely and direct pressure” on Chun to give into demands (Gohar
1988, 55). The US told the Chun regime that martial law or military repression would not be
tolerated, and the torture incident and “April 13 measures” pushed the large, more liberal-minded
middle class and reform-minded, college-educated white collar workers to get involved (Kim
2003; Lee 1993; Yun 1997). Kim Dae-jung (김대중) and Kim Young Sam (김영삼) work with
the Committee for Promoting Democracy in May 1984 and form New Korean Democratic Party
in 1985 and consolidate the entire democracy movement in May 27, 1985 at Headquarters of
National Struggle to Acquire a Democratic Constitution (Kim 2003; Lee 1993). In 1987, the
Reunification Democratic Party and National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution formed.
The National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution was now more than just students and labor
– The United Minjung (People’s) Movement for Democracy and Unification, Catholic/Protestant
church, Buddists, intellectuals, politicians, artists/literary world, those affected by Gwangju
Uprising and/or family of political prisoners (Yun 1997, 164).
Survivors continued to struggle although especially prisoners who did hunger strikes or
refused to listen to orders in Gwangju, but really it took a hold in Seoul and greater Korea (Na
2001). A number of students self-immolated or cast themselves off buildings in the name of
Gwangju’s memory (Na 2001). Police tried to block commemoration, continuous vigils and
commemoration events over the years turned into a yearly event in May, and, in 1987 it
snowballed into the June Uprising (or June Democratic Struggle) (Na 2001). Chun labeled those
involved in the Gwangju Uprising as “rioters” with “rebellious elements” to justify the massacre
and worked to oppress/repress dissidents to that view through harassment and stalking. (Na
2001) Nonetheless, a Commemorating Ceremony was held in 1981 and Mongwol Cemetery
(where victims were buried) stayed instead of being moved in 1983-84 (Na 2001). Further, a
signature campaign began in 1985 and rallies for constitutional change in 1986 (Gohar 1988). In
1986, the Chun government chose to negotiate. It slows the protests, but the negotiations are not
working (Kern and Laux 2017). Early 1986, the government played off the regional and

ideological divides of the pro-democracy group, and, by late 1986, the negotiations were almost
full stop (Kern and Laux 2017). As is a theme, another watershed moment comes in February
1987 with the torture death of Seoul National University student, Park Chong-col (박종철) by
police. It rattled and angered the nation. Any legitimacy and trust regained by starting
negotiations with the pro-democracy movement were all further down the drain even after trying
to make concessions (Gohar 1988; Kern and Laux 2017). The ambiguity of going halfway was
no longer possible with the protests and pressure, so, in a last ditch effort, Chun suggested
suspending elections and negotiations until after the 1988 Seoul Olympics on April 13, 1987 (the
“April 13 Measures.”) (Kim 2003; Yun 1997). Chun’s suggestion was not taken well and he was
forced to concede to the massive demonstrations and protest of over a million people in Seoul
during the June Uprising of 1987 during his June 29th Declaration (Kim 2003; Park 2012; Yun
1997). Chun allowed for ally, General Roh Tae-woo (노태우) to run for office and host
presidential elections later that year. The so-called “political miracle,” was that Roh’s
“democratic reforms” he listed during his platform speech (direct election, human and civil rights
granted and guarded, amnesty for protestors/demonstrators, etc.) were massive unrestricted
concessions to the pro-democracy movement which Chun even conceded (Gohar 1988, 66).
Roh’s liberalization brought toleration to political opposition, freedom of the press and media,
local political autonomy restored (lost in the 1961 junta), and autonomy of the social sector
(education, student groups, unions) (Lee 1993, 356-7).
In a way, the sharp turnaround made the movement lose most of its fervor with the
middle class demobilizing and Roh was to win the 89% turnout election (Gohar 1988) (55%
voted for Kim Dae-jung or Kim Young-sam). Roh’s regime was uninspiring in solving economic
woes though which led to frustration (Lee 1993): “the kind of omnipresent dynamism of the
Korean people in previous decades, despite its being under authoritarian regimes, now lost its
core. The ‘can do’ attitude that had been wide-spread among the population turned into despair
and cynicism” (Lee 1993, 358). That being said, most of what the public wanted was there and
the only wall was the Kim Young Sam versus 19 Kim Dae-jung divide stalled civilian government
but the writing was on the wall for the end of the elites and the new constitution that came in
with President Roh inaugurated the Sixth Republic of Korea and future elections would bring
more reform (Gohar 1988; Lee 1993). The diverse and organized coalition movement from civil
society had forged the path to democratization in the crucible of the political structures.
Theoretical Analysis and Discussion
This section will be dominated by two sub-sections. In the first section, I will introduce
the larger theories of democratization by Samuel Huntington and the response by Kang Jung In.
Kang goes into detail on Huntington’s weakness in discussing Confucianism and East Asia’s
compatibility for democracy. Of course, Kang is not the only one to respond to Huntington on
the weaknesses in his work20. But, I chose to use Kang’s arguments because he more directly
19
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deals with Huntington’s weaknesses vis-à-vis South Korea compared to the literature at large. In
the second section, I examine the causal factors leading to South Korean democratization using
the agent-structure continuum. Understanding first the theories of East Asia’s compatibility with
democracy and then the specific theories regarding South Korea, one gets a more holistic
understanding of the importance of the movements.
Theories of Democratization and East Asia’s Compatibility
There may be nowhere better to start on democratization than Samuel P. Huntington’s
theoretical framework for democratization in his 1991 work, “Democracy’s Third Wave.”
Huntington’s theory, however, like most concepts in political science, does not go unchallenged.
A work by Kang Jung In from 1999 gives a forceful and direct critique of Huntington’s
consideration of East Asia’s and Confucianism’s compatibility with East Asia.
Huntington, in his broader theoretical framework, argues that democratization has
emerged on the global stage in a series of “waves.” The first wave emerged around the 1820s
when the male vote was expanded to a larger population and the second wave was in the victory
of the Allies in World War II and the post-war era (Huntington 1991, 12). Huntington claimed
the world in 1974-1990 was in the midst of a third wave. He argues five crucial factors in this
new “third wave” (Huntington 1991, 13). 1) The “performance legitimacy” of authoritarian
regimes – that is, authoritarian regimes struggled to deal with complex problems of governance
without the use of repression. 2) The global economic growth of the 1960s – that is, the living
situation, education, and urban middle class all increased, so certain actions by non-democratic
regimes were no longer tolerable. 3) The church’s emergence and opposition to authoritarianism
– that is, Huntington’s argument for a “strong correlation between Western Christianity and
democracy” (Huntington 1991, 13). 4) The change in foreign policy of the European
Community, Soviet Union, and US – that is, the European community encouraging liberalism
through trade, USSR declining in influence, and the US promoting democracy more abroad. It
was becoming less tenable for the US to assist foreign anti-communist dictators nearing the end
of the Cold War (Huntington 1991, 15). 5) The “snowballing” effect – that is, consecutive
transitions and concessions make it slowly easier for democracy.
Huntington, in an interesting segment of his article, takes particular note of obstacles to
democracy in East Asia (Huntington 1991, 20). He argues that East Asia’s current “home-grown”
communist systems21, military regimes, personal dictatorships, personal democracies, and lack of
democratic history make it more difficult for democratization across the region. Furthermore,
using Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee as examples, he argues that East Asian political
leaders and elites have had weaker commitment to democratic ideals. Lastly, he argues and
Bell, Daniel. Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2006.
__________. East Meets West Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2000.
21
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lingers on the idea that East Asia’s political culture and tradition, largely influenced by
Confucianism, are major obstacles to democratization (Huntington 1991, 20). Huntington
confidently posits that the undemocratic or antidemocratic nature of Confucianism has been well
established (Huntington 1991, 20). In Confucian governments/society, he argues that rights
against state were almost non-existent, harmony and cooperation was favored over disagreement
and competition22, and there were no autonomous social institutions (a “merged society and
state”; Huntington 1991, 24). He claims that “in practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced
societies have been inhospitable to democracy” (Huntington 1991, 24). Huntington gives a weak
caveat that, because culture is dynamic, cultural obstacles are not necessarily permanent and that
Confucianism is too complex to generalize (Huntington 1991, 30). In the end, although confident
in the development of many East Asia countries, Huntington closes with: “economic
development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real” (Huntington 1991,
33).
Kang Jung In, on the other hand, gives a forceful response to Huntington. Kang argues
that Huntington’s theoretical model is overgeneralized and Huntington’s claims that
Confucianism is an obstacle to democracy and that any Confucian democracy is inherently a
deviation23 are weakly supported and not well-drawn (Kang 1999). Kang argues that, not only
are Huntington’s arguments Eurocentric, Huntington even misrepresents liberal development in
the Western contexts (Kang 1999, 320). Kang notes how liberalism evolved out of highly
anti-democratic ideas and how its evolution was “not monolithic or unilinear” (Kang 1999,
320-1). Kang posits that it is unfair to compare modern, evolved liberalism with classic
Confucianism without applying the same caveats for evolution to Confucianism (Kang 1999).
Kang further argues that classical Confucianism is, in reality, more amenable to democracy
compared to the highly undemocratic tendencies of Christian fundamentalism (Kang 1999, 322).
There is no such thing as “fundamental Confucianism.”(Kang 1999, 322). Kang credits this to
Confucianism’s skepticism to absolute truth, unlike Christianity (or Islam24) which have strong
absolute ideas about truth (Kang 1999). Lastly, Kang notes Confucianism’s very low
susceptibility to military rule because it ideologically and historically centered itself on civilian
government and service.
Kang argues that, just because Western cultures eventually accepted democracy and
Confucian cultures did not initially, does not mean that Confucian Asia is “inhospitable” to
democracy (Kang 1999). He pushes back against Huntington’s substantial claim of Christianity
and democratic development (Kang 1999, 326). Christianity has an anti-liberal history and there
is no indication of “salvation of democracy” in East Asia (Kang 1999, 319 and 326). In fact,
Kang reverses Huntington’s argument by saying that Christian democracy is a contradiction in
terms and confucianism may have advantages more amenable to democracy (i.e. community
22

Huntington insists that this reality was anti-pluralistic and that “the conflict of people, groups, and parties was…
dangerous and illegitimate” in Confucian societies (Huntington 1991, 24).
23
“‘Confucian democracy’ is clearly a contradiction in terms.” (Huntington 1991, 27)
24
Huntington has a section on Islam in his article and Kang does make limited responses to Islam to further mark the
comparison of Confucianism to Huntington’s arguments, but I have omitted them.

favored over individual) (Kang 1999, 326). Further, Kang says that Huntington makes arguments
against East Asian democracies much too early – how can you have high standards for such
nascent democracies? Lastly, the claim that Confucianism’s consensus and stability over
competition and change is not exactly a fair dichotomy and too far drawn for Huntington’s
purposes (Kang 1999). To Kang, Huntington, by reducing “the bewildering complexity of Third
World politics and overlooking the “rich experiences in the evolution of the Western model of
democracy,” has “failed to marshall all this phenomena into a consistent and objective theoretical
framework” (Kang 1999, 336-337).
Huntington makes few direct points about South Korean democratization and the few he
does make are not entirely accurate, but his argument cannot be discounted entirely. Returning to
the five factors of the third wave that he lists, the South Korean democratization movement did
share a history with each. 1) The “performance legitimacy” of the Chun regime was very
apparent in the 1980s – notably the “birth defect” of Gwangju and the “torture incident” in 1987
(Gohar 1988; Kim 2003, 233; Yun 1997). 2) South Korea was the example of the economic
growth of the 1960s and the economic development did play a part in democratization (Heo and
Yun 2014). 3) Both the Protestant and Catholic churches did oppose authoritarianism during the
movement (Chang 1998; Gohar 1988). 4) The US did have a change of heart from 1980-1 to
1986-7 from pragmatically and tacitly allowing Chun’s regime to repress to an openly pressuring
Chun to negotiate and against martial law (Kim 2003; Lee 1993; Yun 1997). 5) “Snowballing,”
as Huntington describes it, did happen during the Chun regime and from the transition to the Roh
government (Kern and Laux 2017). Even after Roh, with both Kim Young Sam and Kim
Dae-jung’s presidencies, democratization would continue and more reforms would be
implemented (Kim 2003; Lee 1993). In agreement with most of the South Korea democratization
literature, Huntington notes how the culture and economy clashed (Jean 2003) and that increased
urbanization, education, and development of the middle class was a crucial piece (Huntington
1991; Yun 1997). In less agreement with the literature, he argues that the spread of Christianity
weakened Confucianism in South Korea, and therefore allowed more space for democracy
(Huntington 1991). Although Christianity did weaken Confucian ideals in some ways and
Christian groups played an important part in the second democratization movement, labeling it as
the premier driver to democracy is grossly reductive and Eurocentric. His arguments about South
Korea’s struggle with “dominant-party systems25” and pluralism were based on a
misunderstanding of the reality and his predictions that the new government may be tempted to
repress did not happen (Huntington 1991; Kang 1999). In the end, I agree with Kang that
25

Huntington and Kang are referring to the party merger in 1990 between Roh’s (and Chun’s) Democratic Justice
Party (DJP), Kim Dae-jung’s and Kim Young Sam’s Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) (already splintered from
the original New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP)), and Kim Jong-pil’s (김종필) New Democratic Republican
Party to form the New Korea Party (NKP) (originally the Democratic Liberal Party in 1990, but renamed in 1995).
Huntington argues that this was done in an anti-pluralistic pattern from Confucianism (Huntington 1991, 26). On the
other hand, Kang argues that the dominant-party argument is too generalized for East Asia and is reductionist to
decry “Confucianism” in any cases he does give. For example, South Korea has had regional rivalries and the North
Korean threat as potential pushers for the dominant-party systems (Kang 1999, 332). In the end, Kang argues that
parties merged for elite not popular interests and, in 1997, Kim Dae-jung, the opposition for literally decades, was
elected anyways (Kang 1999, 332).

Huntington’s arguments do not give Confucianism or East Asian society the correct level of
credit it deserved, are too general, and oversimplified. Maybe that is just the price one pays for
trying to make a global theoretical framework, but, nonetheless, I view Kang’s work as adding a
clarification and rebuttal for the East Asian region and complexifying and deepening the theory
overall.
Discussion of Explanatory Factors in South Korean Case
As happens with most important historical events, academics differ widely on the most
important theoretical and qualitative causations of the success of South Korea’s democratization
movement in the mid- to late-1980s during the “contentious politics” era (Kern and Laux 2017,
246). The best way to frame this dispute, as with most democratization analysis, is through
understanding it as an agent-structure debate: Was it changes in social, political, and/or economic
structures that allowed for democratization to occur? Or did the agents involved reach some
“negotiated” change? (Kern and Laux 2017). History does not give either satisfaction though of
being completely agent or structure. In South Korea, to echo Huntington and slightly change his
original meaning: structures give the opportunity, but “political leadership makes it real”
(Huntington 1991, 33). The actors (state and democratization movement) and structures though,
were in a constant state of flux, and so it is best to understand it as the forces pushing and pulling
each other at differ and set the stage for the confrontation; it is about which side has power and in
which political opportunity structure (Kern and Laux 201726). In the end, structures are
important, but often overemphasized in the South Korean case – I want to spotlight this aspect of
the agency side: civil society, social movements, students, and coalition-building.
First, one of the more common explanations is what I call the traditional structure
approach: that it was economic development, elite fragmentation, and eventual concession that
brought democracy to South Korea. In essence, the exclusionary politics and labor repression by
the state-development sector cartel brought its own demise (Lee 1991). The agricultural sector,
which was a large part of the population’s economy, weakened during the rapid growth, so the
rural population shrinks – especially in the Jeolla region (Jean 2003; Lee 1991). During the rise
in protests in the mid-1980s, the middle class stayed neutral – especially the ones that grew from
economic development, but the college educated and the white collar workers were much more
open to reform and it was the most fertile ground for an expansion of the democratization
movement (Lee 1991). On the other hand, pressure from the business elite changed. If the US
and the international community, because the 1988 Olympics in Seoul were soon, you cannot use
martial law to quell opposition, you need to give in in some way (Gohar 1988). Further, under
such immense pressure, it is hard to argue that there was not some form of disagreement in the
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The authors of this work say the state and protestors played a sort of “brinkmanship game” – referring to the sense
that neither wanted to outright confront each other, but wanted to get as close as possible. I share the view of the
structure working on actors and viceversa, but do not think the success of the movement boils down only to
flip-flopping of cooperation (concession) and non-cooperation (repression) from the state – although it was a piece. I
am trying to expand on the concept and compare the two movements for clues.

military (Kim 2013, 2015), but whether it is to the level of importance or “schism” is debatable27
(Heo and Yun 2014; Yun 1997). Many saw the Chun regime as quite unified and the argument
that there were divisions in the “new military” is not very strong (Yun 1997). Nonetheless,
“economic development alone cannot explain President Chun’s decision making for transition to
democracy in 1987” (Kim 2015, 171) and it is important to recognize that subordination of the
military to civilian rule and customs was crucial (Kim 2003). The praetorian regime under Park
and the people largely valued security and economic development more than democratic values
and economic distribution – until Chun in the mid-1980s when it was no longer acceptable by the
populace (Kim 2003). In the end, the developmental aspect set the education and economic
situation for the people to push for pro-democracy, and, even if it was weak division, the
intra-military and intra-elite aspect set the tone for the government (Heo and Yun 2014; Kim
2013, 2015).
A second influential concept is the idea that “political opportunity structures” shape the
social movements which bring democratization and challenges whether elite fragmentation is
truly a prerequisite (Chang 2008; Yun 2017). Repression is a key piece of political opportunity
structures (Chang 2008). The literature has conflicting quantitative findings – the only thing
acknowledged is the connection between government coercion and protest/rebellion (Chang
2008), but the solution is to look at the quality instead of quantity of protest events (Chang
2008). Repression leads to the “unintended consequences” of “increase in organizational
capacity” and “changes in the tactical repertoire and frame development” (Chang 2008, 652). In
South Korea, repression bound together social groups into a stronger and more unified
democracy movement – understanding the pieces is more important than the net total (Chang
2008). It gives way to more “alliance forming events” (Chang 2008). Both internal and external
factors exist to this coalition building (see next section): a centralized power allows for a
centralized target and diversifies enemies (Chang 2008). The case of South Korea shows that a
low, quantitative protest amount does not mean a low chance of movement success (Chang
2008). They were able to deter the isolated protests and weak social movements in 1979-1980,
but not the movements overall success (Chang 2008; Yun 1997). It was organization,
cooperation, and centralization for social movements in the new political opportunity structures
that brought huge success in 1987 (Yun 1997). Normally, repression goes up, political
opportunity goes down, but 1982-3 concessions changed that and the external pressure and
opposition parties’ success in general elections in 1985 brought more political opportunity
structures (Yun 1997). Although elite fragmentation and power structures were a piece, they
were not the core driver, and, framed in this way, it shows that democratization can succeed with
it (Yun 1997).
The key conceptual response on the agent side of the continuum has been civil society
and social movements. There are two things needed to take advantage of those traditional
structures in South Korea: 1) resources for organization and 2) alliance building (Yun 1997).
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Kim 2013, Heo and Yun 2014, and Kim 2015 are three articles that are in conversation with one another about
whether economic development was more important (Heo and Yun 2014) or intra-military schism (Kim 2013, 2015)
in understanding democratization. I try to reconcile them here.

Civil society is not a monolith, so you need diverse groups with political opportunity to be
developed in multiple sectors (Yun 1997). “Movements are often staged by actors from multiple
sectors of society” – and this was key to the South Korean movements (Chang 2008, 657).
Students28, laborers/workers, Christians29 (Protestant and Catholic) were among the most
important (Chang 1988; Gohar 1988; Katsiaficas 2009). Journalists, media personnel,
intellectuals/professors, civil rights groups, youth, politicians and their staff – were the highest
participants in protests, but even the urban poor, farmers, writers, critics, Buddhist clergy all
joined in a number of events (Chang 2008, 656; Gohar 1988, 54).
Historically, students have been crucial agents in regime change movements in South
Korea. They participated in protests and demonstrations during the Japanese colonial era and
pushed for the resignation and overthrow of President Syngman Rhee in 1960 (Park 2012). The
movements in the 1960s were a “prototype” of sorts for the 1970s and 1980s movements (Kim
2006, 627). The 1970s and 1980s saw mass protests by students and the 1980-1987 radical
democracy movement and success was no different (Park 2012). The organizational structures
did not appear out of nowhere, but some were leftover from the movements in the 1970s. It was
especially crucial the existence of the underground organizational structure that helped
grass-roots organizations. (Park 2005). Where does it come from? Confucian tradition gives
intellectual elites and, by consequence students, a sense of being the moral conscience of society
(Park 2005). The self-perception, patriotism and nationalism of students is best exemplified in
the multiple cases of self-immolation throughout the movement: At Seoul National University,
there were four self burnings in one month and a girl drowned herself in Han River – all for the
cause of democracy and a sense duty – “obligation of the living to the dead” especially those of
Gwangju (Gohar 1988; Na 2001, 486; Park 2012).
Students, although radical in some segments30 were best described as the main players in
forming the complex autonomous organizations and movement especially alongside labor, as we
saw in the historical segment (Katsiaficas 2009), but they were not the only ones. Education,
literacy, and political consciousness rose thanks to the work of some religious and non-profit
groups, especially among workers who were ripe to understand the situation in 1980 and in the
later 1980s (Shamsur Rahamn 1999). Churches even facilitated other groups’ protests by
allowing them to be done on church premises which made the police hesitant to break up a
gathering at a church or cathedral. In the 1970s and 1980s – all-night vigils, prayer meetings,
demonstrations, and fasting all became a part of the repertoire of the movement (Chang 1998).
Churches were also an important tie to the urban and rural poor communities and tacitly
supportive of the student groups while being openly critical of the government (Chang 1998) –
28

And Christian student groups (Chang 2008; Chang 1998)
To get a detailed look at the emergence of Christian groups in the democratization movement see Chang 1998.
30
Cho notes how anti-Communism was the “pseudo-consensus” in 1960s. He reminisces that the education in the
1970s and 1980s fostered a unique and easily radicalizable “enmity-oriented” political culture” (Cho 2009, 120).
Students quickly replaced the Communist Party (공산당) with the military, capitalists, and government which made
made students more militaristic and extreme in their response to the government compared to the populace at large
(Kwon 2005). The 1970s and 1980s brought a new transition to pro-democracy and more progressive views, but
radical segments persisted (Cho 2009).
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much like the religious groups and military groups felt. “Their religious conscience would not
allow them to watch idly as the fledgling democracy in South Korea eroded and the poor and
powerless suffered. The emergence of an authoritarian regime politicized church leaders by
forcing them to address directly the regression of democratic politics” (Chang 1998, 462). This
self-perception31 was important in worker consciousness, students and the religious groups as
well (Park 2012). In the end, the coalition-building shows, “the power that an educated and
enlightened people have” (Gohar, 1988, 68).
The debate on the usefulness civil society has been huge in South Korean
democratization debates and it normally splits into two camps: 1) Civil society is not useful or
relevant to South Korea because it is an inherently Western concept or 2) Civil society is useful
in understanding the reality in South Korea and as an analytical tool for understanding social
movements. (Kim 1996). One scholar divides “civil society” as a historical versus an analytical
concept – the historical is limited in use, but the analytical concept is very useful for theoretical
analysis (Kim 1996). They argue civil society was present in 1960-1, in 1970-9, and then
crucially in 1985-1987 where it worked with the political society (i.e. parties and established
political opposition) to push for democratization (Kim 1996). The crucial step was getting
liberal-minded, college-educated Korean middle class: “The middle class was no longer satisfied
with only economic prosperity – they wanted political freedom” (Kim, 1996, 91). The era of
receiving economic development in exchange for repression was over; the middle class was
willing to take the risk.
In the end though, “the rise of civil society in South Korea was intimately related to the
process of democratization” (Koo 2002, 44). Civil society emerged before the democratic
transition and played a crucial role in it (Koo 2002). It was the merger of dissident groups
merged with the larger population to create a stronger movement that included more people. It
was a consolidation of the diverse frustrations of the diverse groups (Koo 2002). It was political
parties and social movements operating in the same space towards the same goal of
democratization in South Korea (Lee 2014). Although the parties were traditionally weak in
South Korea (not trusted and institutionally excluded), they became vehicles for the stronger
social movement in the later stages of the movements (Lee 2014). Civil society was the real
reason for the success of the democratization movement – as in it is not a top-down version, but
a bottom-up version of the movement (Yun 1997).
One last factor is left glaring: the Gwangju Uprising. Was it a major factor in the
movements? Well, it was certainly the critical juncture: it became the “birth defect” of a
“murderer’s regime” (lost all legitimacy), radicalized segments (especially students) against the
government, allowed for the definition of ideologies, and allowed the emergence of
organizational capacity and systemization of the coalitions (Kim 2003). Was Gwangju the main
catalyst to both movements? For the first, it was clearly the main driver – there is no doubt there
– but the second, I think it should neither be discounted nor overestimated. It was the “enzyme
remained after defeat” (Na 2001, 486)
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Views of being the conscience of society is also historically a common phenomena in the military.

Comparison of the Two Movements and Conclusion
The two movements can now be considered with all the context and theories in place.
The movement spawning from the Gwangju Uprising in 1980 and its subsequent fizzling
in 1981 can be accounted for by many factors. The opposition in 1979-1980 did not have the
right structures or agents in place after the sudden death of Park (Yun 1997). The attempts at
organization by students was not enough and it remained, in practice, much too decentralized
(Katsiaficas 2009; Na 2001). The US, with all their influence over the regime and the implication
of ambivalence to the Gwangju Uprising, remained primarily on the sidelines (Na 2001;
Shorrock 1986). Although it reached national attention and demonstrations, the movement was,
in practice, only one city (Na 2001). Gwangju was economically, socially, political and spatially
isolated 32 (Jean 2003; Na 2001;Yun 1997). The students’ radicality pushed away moderate
sectors of society and the labor movement – and the civil society and social movement as whole
– was nascent in 1980-1 (Yun 1997). These combined to allow the wide acceptance of
misinformation that labeled the Gwangju people student’s radical purpose and goal of democratic
regime change as a communist or North Korean incursion. Under that light of false information,
Chun regime’s lack of restraint and violence in suppressing the movement in Gwangju was easier
to justify (Kern and Laux 2017; Kim 2003; Na 2001). By the time the truth around the incident
was caught by international media, it was too late (Katsiaficas 2009). The movement had mostly
subsided by that point and the Chun government continued its repressive policies on protests and
autonomous organizations all the way through 1981 (Chang 2008; Yun 1997).
On the other hand, the success of the second movement can be attributed to a number of
different factors. After liberalization, a movement with the “organizational duality” of the
“underground war” and space for legal protests emerged (Na 2001; Yun 1997). The high
organizational capability of the movement was unprecedented (Na 2001; Park 2012). The
complex connections from civil society between civil groups, provinces, and sectors – especially
the addition of middle class, college-educated, and liberal/reform-minded white collar workers
(Na 2001, but also see above). Further, unlike the Gwangju Uprising, the political parties and
national leaders – although divided – were included and involved (Katsiaficas 2009). Spatially,
the movement centered around the capital of the country and not the historically rowdy province
(Jean 2003; Na 2001). The US, alongside international eyes regarding the 1988 Seoul Olympics,
seeing a way to right a previous wrong, directly pressured the regime (Gohar 1988). The Chun
regime felt it had lost legitimacy, and, after a number of fumbles to restore it with the
overwhelming pressure from civil society, forced the government to give concessions (Yun
1997). Unlike in Gwangju, both students and police, in general, showed more restraint from
violence in the 1986-1987 years – which actually strengthened the cause versus the repression
seen in Gwangju. The pressure led to the seemingly incredible nature of Roh’s concessions in the
“political miracle” (Gohar 1988).
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From my travels back and forth to this city, I can attest to this first-hand.

The South Korean case is a “model for insurgencies throughout Asia” (Katsiaficas 2009,
58), and, the difference between the earlier and later movements show us that it is the success in
forming a civil society and social movements which built strong, organized, and diverse
coalitions in the political opportunity structures. Civil society was a crucial driver in South
Korea. Further, although it should not be overestimated by concerned parties, the Gwangju
Uprising had a piece in the second movement. The unique nature of these movements and the
emergence of democracy in South Korea will continue to be deeply studied and will be useful in
future comparative studies – I am merely making a drop in the bucket. Movements and
democracy do not appear out of nowhere – there is always a history. It does not magically appear
because of economic development or trade – there is a need for the base social and political
structures to be formed – this is shown perfectly in comparing the two movements. Both had the
economy in the back of their mind, but the movement that was successful had a larger social and
political grouping and civil society which the previous one lacked. The Chun-Roh transition’s
seemingly instant concessions (especially to direct elections) and restraint from violence has a
history in those movements. South Korea is one of the premier models of democracy today
because of the students and many other brave groups that had the vision to see what could be
accomplished together.
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